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Abstract
Since the 1960s, the question whether markets are efficient or not is
controversially discussed. One reason for the difficulty to overcome the
controversy is the lack of a universal, but also precise, quantitative def-
inition of efficiency that is able to graduate between different states of
efficiency. The main purpose of this article is to fill this gap by devel-
oping a measure for the efficiency of markets that fulfill all the stated
requirements. It is shown that the new definition of efficiency, based on
informational-entropy, is equivalent to the two most used definitions of ef-
ficiency from Fama and Jensen. The new measure therefore enables steps
to settle the dispute over the state of efficiency in markets. Moreover, it
is shown that inefficiency in a market can either arise from the possibil-
ity to use information to predict an event with higher than chance level,
or can emerge from wrong pricing/ quotes that do not reflect the right
probabilities of possible events. Finally, the calculation of efficiency is
demonstrated on a simple game (of coin tossing), to show how one could
exactly quantify the efficiency in any market-like system, if all probabili-
ties are known.
Keywords: Market Efficiency, Information Theory, Econophysics, Informa-
tion in Capital Markets, Market Prediction, Game Theory
1 Introduction
Markets are an important part of our daily life. Markets (like supermarkets, the
labor market or the stock market) influence nearly every aspect of human inter-
actions. Therefore, their properties are subject to extensive studies. One of the
most interesting claims with respect to markets (especially the stock market)
is that markets are efficient. Thus, the so-called ’efficient market hypothesis’
(EMH) has become a very powerful and influencing concept. It is, for instance,
the conceptional basis for the option pricing theory (see e.g. [6]) and it sup-
ported the invention of exchange traded funds (see e.g. [18]). As a result, the
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Nobel committee acknowledged work that has been done on the efficient market
hypothesis with the Nobel prize 2013 to Fama, Hansen and Shiller [15, 20, 43]
’for their empirical analysis of asset prices’.1
The surprising decision of the Nobel committee to admit the price to a
supporter (Fama) and a skeptic (Shiller) of the EMH, however, shows that,
despite of the work that had been done in this field since the 1960 [5], the
question whether markets are efficient or not is still unsolved. On the one
hand, is the opinion that markets are overall efficient (see e.g. [14, 31, 30]),
but, on the other hand, exists the view that efficiency is not a good description
of market behavior (see e.g. [44, 42]). The main purpose of this paper is
to overcome the discrepancies between the two positions on the efficiency of
markets by developing a measure for the efficiency, as for instance Lo requested
it [27]. Such a measure of efficiency leads to a new way of looking and analyzing
markets. It changes the focus from the question ”Are markets efficient?” to the
question ”How efficient are markets?” It enables the examination of sources of
inefficiency and could lead to mechanisms to make markets more efficient.
The reason why the efficiency of markets is still an unsolved problem lies in
various difficulties connected to the problem. One difficulty in the discussion is
that the thesis of efficiency as well as the thesis of inefficiency is supported by
a wide range of different empirical results.
The proponents of efficiency studied for instance fund manager performances,
examined the random structure of price time series or performed event studies.
One of the first was Alfred Cowels. He analyzed that fund manager perfor-
mances indicate efficiency of markets [10]. Which was further supported by
studies of Jensen [23],Treynor [46] and Sharpe [39]. Fama (based on the funda-
mental work of Samuelson [37]) examined the random structure of price time
series [12]2 in context of efficiency of markets. Furthermore, event studies [16, 3]
supported the EMH empirically.
But, the thesis of inefficiency of markets is also supported by empirical work.
Starting with studies by Shiller [41] comparing the volatility of markets to that
of underlying information and by tests of the ability of markets to represent the
information of future dividend structures (see also [26]), these studies showed
evidence that markets are not overall efficient. Further studies showed the
inefficiency of markets examining seasonal effects [2], over-/under-reaction [11]
or earning anomalies, which could be value-effects [17], size anomalies [4, 9] or
earning anomalies from technical trading [1].
This concentration on the verification or falsification of the EMH shows that
the current discussion is mainly focused on the binarity of the thesis. Binarity
of the thesis means that the EMH is bounded between the extremes of the
statements that a market is efficient or inefficient. Even so most researchers
know that neither is the case, it is still difficult to find an appropriate description
for the state in between.3
In this paper it will be shown that it is possible to overcome this mostly
binary discussion over the efficient market hypothesis by deriving a way to mea-
1All three laureates have explored different aspects of efficiency from theoretical ground
work to analysis of information dynamics in markets [12, 14, 41, 42, 22, 21].
2The random structure of price time series was also independently examined earlier by
Mandelbrot [32]
3In 2004 Lo described an approach to overcome this problem, but he stayed qualitative in
his description [28]
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sure efficiency gradually. Doing so, it changes the focus of the description from
a qualitative to a quantitative definition. The key to overcome the discrepancy
in the discussion is to define a universal, mathematical precise definition.
Another difficulty is based on the proposed definitions for efficiency. At the
moment, there is no unique, general accepted definition for efficiency. Instead,
different definitions were proposed in the past. The first article that defines
efficiency is by Fama [12]. In his work, he summarizes different approaches
studying efficiency and he refers to the true value of a stock to define efficiency
(see section 2.2 for a more detailed discussion.) In the following, more empirical
work on efficiency (as outlined in the previous paragraph) led to a more detailed
view on efficiency and an alternative definition by Fama which focused more on
information [13]. A few years later, Jensen [24] emphasized a different aspect
with his definition by introducing the impossibility of earning profits as relevant
for efficiency (see section 2.3). In 2004, Timmermann and Granger extended
the definition with the aspect of informational costs, search technologies and
forecasting models which brings the focus to more practical aspects in the effi-
ciency discussion [45]. But this extension stays on the same conceptional basis
as the definition of Jensen. Therefore, it is not further considered in this paper.
Other definitions of efficiency where defined for special purposes, for example in
the minority game [8], where efficiency is set equal to a minimum in volatility.
Although, the definitions gave a good intuition about what is meant by effi-
ciency, they were not able to combine mathematical precision with universality.
Either the definition is universal, but lacking mathematical precision and man-
ageability, like the first definition of efficiency by Fama (see section 2.1) that
is mainly qualitative [12]. Therefore, the ability to use it on concrete cases is
reduced. Or, the definition has a detailed mathematical description, but it lacks
universality, like the Challet-Definition of efficiency on the minority game [8].
In this case efficiency can be shown only for special market assumptions. That
leads to a situation in which it is ambiguous when a market is called efficient.
This paper solves this problem by finding a universal, mathematical precise def-
inition. Furthermore, I show with a theoretical analysis that inefficiency can be
caused by two different mechanisms.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section, I describe the
status quo of efficiency concepts. In section 3, I introduce my new efficiency
definition which covers the main ideas of the existing definitions (which will
be shown in section 4). To derive the new measure, I consider developments
on information theory of C.Shannon [38] and C.L.Kelly [25]. Shannon first in-
troduced the concept of information entropy in the context of signal transfer.
Kelly used the framework to a game theoretic environment to derive an opti-
mal betting strategy for games. I use this framework to develop my idea of a
measurement for efficiency of markets [35].
In section 5, I derive new insights regarding the sources of inefficiency en-
hancing the definition to pricing mechanisms. The paper concludes by using the
new approach to a game of coin tossing, demonstrating how the new approach
can work analyzing a real system.
3
2 Different views on efficiency
As described in the introduction, there is no unique, generally accepted defi-
nition for the efficiency of a market. Instead, existing definitions are not com-
pletely congruent but somehow overlapping and focus on different aspects of
efficient markets. The different concepts of efficiency can be associated with
different characteristics in the context of efficiency. Without being exhaustive I
cluster the different aspects in three approaches.
2.1 True-Value-Efficiency
I call the first approach true-value-efficiency. It states that ’actual prices at
every point in time represent very good estimates of intrinsic values ’ [12]. It
means the prices in a stock market reflect at every time the true values of the
companies. Unfortunately, the term ’true value’ is not a well-defined term in
context of efficient markets. One reason might be the model dependency of this
approach, (as described in [41] and [26]) which means that it always leaves the
question open if reported inefficiencies are due to a not well defined model or
due to real inefficiencies. ’Thus, market efficiency perse is not testable.’ [14]
In fact, it is impossible to prove the true-value-efficiency of a system without
superior knowledge of the underlying system. In the literature, the superior
knowledge is incorporated through valuation models as Fama describes [14].
Therefore, efficiency needs a specification in its approach. Such a specification
is often strongly connected to assumptions about stock market systems and the
valuation of stocks. This means different models could lead to different results
about the efficiency of the same market. Since a definition of efficiency should
have its focus on a general approach, it is hardly appropriate to use such specific
valuation approaches. To define a special model for each new system (for the
calculation of a true value) would undermine the intention to define efficiency
in a universal way. Therefore, true-value-efficiency is not further considered for
a definition of efficiency.
2.2 Informational-Efficiency
Another characteristic of efficiency is described by Fama as ’a market in which
prices always fully reflect available information is called efficient ’ [13]. I refer to
this as informational-efficiency. Informational-efficiency is one of the most
referred aspects in the discussion about the efficient market hypothesis (see
[29]). Informational-efficiency claims that any information that influences the
price is already priced in the market, because otherwise traders could use this
information to generate a profit.4 Different kinds of information, which are
incorporated in the price, are thereby related to different kinds of efficiency.
In his famous article from 1970 Fama states three kinds of efficiencies that
should be distinguished in the discussion [13]5:
4In later discussions this is weakened by the statement that only information up to a
certain information level is incorporated [19].
5In a later article, Fama connected these different kinds of efficiency to empirical studies
[14]. He connected weak efficiency to the test of return predictability, semi-strong efficiency
to studies about the influence of new information and strong efficiency to tests of private
information.
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1. In a ’weak’ efficient market, prices only reflect all information given by
past time series.
2. In a ’semi-strong’ efficient market, prices reflect all public available infor-
mation.
3. In a ’strong’ efficient market, prices reflect all available information (e.g.
also insider information).
Throughout this paper, I will refer to strong efficiency (unless otherwise men-
tioned) to simplify the description of efficiency in the following. By using strong
efficiency, a specification of underlying information is not necessary.
Informational-efficiency is a less strong concept of efficiency in comparison
to true-value-efficiency, because all true-value-efficient systems are also infor-
mational efficient but not vice versa. This can be shown with the following
argument: If a true value exists, it clearly includes all information about an
asset. So, if the system reflects the true value in the price, it also reflects all
information about the asset in the price. Vice versa this is not the case, be-
cause it is not mandatory that the true value of an asset must be revealed by
all information available.6
2.3 No-Profit-Efficiency
An alternative description to the informational-efficiency is given by Jensen: ’A
market is efficient with respect to information set Θt if it is impossible to make
economic profits by trading on the basis of information set Θt.’ [24] I will refer
to this property as no-profit-efficiency.7
No-profit-efficiency means that no market participant is able to outperform
the market in a systematic way [40]. The definition of no-profit-efficiency follows
the same argument as the informational efficiency. Any profit opportunity is
already taken before one can use it for a profit in the market.8
The no-profit-efficiency is, however, less strong than the informational effi-
ciency, since all informational efficient markets are also no-profit-efficient but
not vice versa. The argument for that is the following: In a market that con-
tains all information, there is no external information on which a profit could be
generated. Whereas, for instance, in a market generated by a complex dynamic,
which is not foreseeable by traders, also no profit could be generated. But it
does not inevitably reflect all information about the system.
6Clearly, this argument depends on the interpretation of the term ’true value’. Since the
term ’true value’ is open for interpretation (as discussed in section 2.1), the conclusion is not
the only possible interpretation.
7As indicated in the introduction, I interpret Θt in a broad view that includes search
technologies and forecasting models as introduced by Timmermann [45]
8Prices in a no-profit-efficient market have to be martingales [24, 37, 33]. A martingale is
given by the following formula:
E(r) = E(r|φ) with r : price, φ : information
This means that the actual price is the best predictor of the future price independent of
information given. Since the concept of martingales is dedicated to time series and not to
information in a system, I will not discuss this aspect in greater detail
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3 Efficiency definition
Based on the efficiency concepts described in the last section, it is now possible
to introduce a unique and simple quantitative measure of efficiency, which I will
call informational efficiency definition. Starting with a simplified version
of the informational efficiency definition in this section,9 I show that the main
properties of the EMH can be derived from these new definition. In section
4, I show vice versa, that the definition of efficiency can also be derived from
the main concepts described in section 2. In section 5, it is then possible to
introduce an enhanced, more general definition.
LetX be a system with a given probability distribution p(x) for an event x in
the system. I define the efficiency of the system X in relation to an information
Y as follows:
Eff(X |Y ) =
H(X |Y )
H(X)
(1)
H(X) is the informational entropy of the system X given by10:
H(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log2 p(x) (2)
H(X |Y ) is the conditional entropy of the system X given the information
Y . For a given information Y = y it is:
H(X |Y = y) = −
∑
y
p(y)
(∑
x
p(x|y) log2 p(x|y)
)
(3)
p(x|y) is the probability that a real event x happens if the information of the
event y is given.11
H(X) can be interpreted in different ways, which covers different aspects of
a system:
1. It measures the amount of uncertainty in the system.
2. It is the mean informational amount (surprise value) contained in the
system. Following Shannon [38], this is the amount of information that
can be transferred.
3. It is a measure of predictability of information content.
For H(X |Y ) the following interpretations are common:
1. H(X |Y ) describes the uncertainty of the system X given the information
Y is known.
9In section 5, I enhance the definition to a more general case.
10Following the definition of Shannon [38]
11 This probability can be calculated from the probability p(y|x) through Bayes formula
p(x|y) =
p(y|x)
p(y|x) + p(y¯|x)
where p(y|x) is the probability to get the information y if the real event x happens and p(y¯|x)
is the probability not getting the informations y if the real event x happens.
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2. The term H(X |Y ) can show how much predictability is in system X when
information Y is known.
Since all interpretations are mathematically identical I will follow all of them
in the subsequent sections and refer to the aspect of the entropy that gives the
best explanation in each situation.
Starting with formula (1), I show that the main ideas from the qualitative
definition of efficiency can be derived from the new efficiency definition: Imagine
a system is fully efficient and therefore Eff(X) = 1. In this case H(X |Y ) =
H(X). The predictability of the system hence is not influenced by an external
information Y . The efficiency of the system to contain exclusive information and
to remain unpredictable is maximal, which corresponds to common qualitative
definitions of an efficient market.
In case of Eff(X) = 0 it follows that H(X |Y ) = 0. The efficiency of the
system to contain exclusive information is, in this case, completely inefficient
because all information of X could be derived by knowing Y , which corresponds
to common qualitative definitions of an inefficient market.
Based on the definition, one can further see that any system with 0 >
Eff(X) > 1, hence, H(X) > H(X |Y ) is not totally efficient. This is plausi-
ble since at least some information of the system X can be predicted by using
information Y . The grade of efficiency in such a case can be quantified between
0% and 100% which enables a graduation of efficiency of the system.12
As standard efficiency Eff(X) of a system, I define the special case with the
information set Y ∗:
Eff(X) = Eff(X |Y ∗) =
H(X |Y ∗)
H(X)
(4)
Where Y ∗ represents all available information about the system X . ’All’
information means the best possible information given to a certain moment in
the given environment. This definition of Y ∗ emphasizes a similarity to the
definition of strong efficiency used by Fama (see section 2.2).
4 Relation to classical approaches
In this section, I show how the new definition can be derived from the two differ-
ent concepts for EMH introduced in section 2, to demonstrate the universality
of the informational efficiency definition.
4.1 Informational-Efficiency
The main definition of informational efficiency, first given by Fama [13] is:
• Prices reflect all available information.
To be able to formalize the ideas behind the concept of efficiency to a new
definition, I adjust some terms to a more appropriate context. My efficiency
definition is not restricted to stock markets; the system to look at could be
12The graduation in efficiency should not be mixed up with the efficiency of a system based
on different information sets as Fama introduced them (see section 2.2). For the relation
between these both see section 4.1.
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a system that generates prices (like markets), but it could also be a system
that generates quotes (like the coin example in section 6) or it could be any
other possible mechanism to make informational content explicit. To take that
into account, I substitute the term ”prices reflect” by the term ”the system
contains”. The term ”containing” in the definition means, that information
from outside the system cannot change the amount of information of the system
X . This change in the formulation does not only maintain the essence of Fama’s
definition of efficiency, but also fulfill the requirement for formalization. With
this change, the informational efficiency definition becomes:
• The system contains all available information.
In the next step, I transfer this formulation into a formula. A system X that
contains information Y can be described as a system where such an information
does not change the informational content of the system given by H(X). This
can be easily expressed using the mutual information M(X,Y ) = H(X) −
H(X |Y ). Because the mutual information is the part of information one could
deduce over the system X by knowing information Y . Applying the mutual
information to our formulation of efficiency it is described as a system where
mutual information
M(X,Y ∗) = 0 (5)
Where Y ∗ is the same information used in formula (4) in the last section.
M(X,Y ∗) = 0 implies that H(X |Y ∗) = H(X). This means the knowledge
of Y ∗ does not change the amount of informational entropy of H(X |Y ∗) in
comparison to H(X). Thereby all available information Y ∗ is contained in the
system.
To the contrary, a completely inefficient system is a system where all infor-
mation of the systemX is revealed by knowing information Y ∗. Such a system is
not efficient because the system H(X) contains information that could be com-
pletely derived from an information set outside the system. In this case, the con-
ditional entropy H(X |Y ∗) = 0 and the mutual information M(X,Y ∗) = H(X).
Based on these thoughts, M(X,Y ∗) can be used to derive a measure of
efficiency of a system. To bound the values between zero and one the measure
has to be scaled with H(X) (the total information of this system). To get zero
as figure for complete inefficiency and one as most efficient figure, the resulting
term is subtracted from one.
Eff(X |Y ∗) = 1−
M(X,Y ∗)
H(X)
= 1−
H(X)−H(X |Y ∗)
H(X)
=
H(X |Y ∗)
H(X)
(6)
As a result, I get exactly the same definition as I have defined in section 3.
So far, I only considered the strong efficiency from the definitions of Fama
[13]. But semi-strong and weak efficiency can also be taken into account. The
connection to semi-strong and weak efficiency can be made by altering the prior
knowledge Y . In this case, efficiency is given by Eff(X |Ysemi) and Eff(X |Yweak),
respectively.
Eff(X |Yweak) =
H(X |Yweak)
H(X)
(7)
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Eff(X |Ysemi) =
H(X |Ysemi)
H(X)
(8)
Eff(X |Ystrong) =
H(X |Ystrong)
H(X)
=
H(X |Y ∗)
H(X)
= Eff(X) (9)
In contrast to the argument for strong efficiency (that the system contains
the information already, as discussed above), the efficiency relative to a partial
information set Y can have an additional reason. A possible alternative expla-
nation for a partial efficiency measure Eff(X |Y ) is that the information is simply
not relevant for the information content of X . Taking Yweak as an example, it
means that a market could either be 100% efficient because information about
past time series is already contained, or it could be because past time series do
not influence the system at all. In any case, Eff(X |Yweak) shows how efficient
the system works in relation to the knowledge of Yweak.
In addition to the explanations in the last paragraph, one further difference
of the new definition, in comparison to the definition given by Fama, is worth
mentioning: It is the dependency from the informational basis. Within the new
definition framework, it is for instance possible that a system is 100% efficient
with respect to semi-strong information but only 60% efficient with respect to
strong information. This can be interpreted as some sort of individual efficiency
measure. If a participant perceives only a subset of information (Y ⊂ Y ∗),
it could be that the system is not 100% efficient in relation to Y ∗, but on an
individual level (in relation to Y ) it seems 100% efficient to the participant. Of
course, the other way around is not possible. A system that lacks efficiency
on a subset of information could never be more efficient if one gets additional
information about the system:
Eff(X |Y ) < 1 with Y ⊂ Y ∗ ⇒ Eff(X |Y ∗) < 1 (10)
4.2 No-Profit-Efficiency
Another aspect of efficiency is the no-profit-property (see section 2.3). To for-
malize this approach, I follow a work done by Kelly [25], who defined an optimal
winning strategy for a participant in a system (given a probabilistic outcome)
without the risk of going bankrupt. Kelly showed, that in this case the maximal
capital growth
Gmax = lim
n→∞
log
Vn
V0
(11)
is given by the mutual information
Gmax(X |Yi) = H(X)−H(X |Yi) (12)
This means, that based on the knowledge Yi of a participant i, the individual
maximal capital growth is Gmax(X |Yi). Following the efficiency definition that
in an efficient market no profit is possible (see section 2.3), the result is that
Gmax should be zero in a completely efficient market. In a completely inefficient
market the opposite is the case. This meansGmax should be maximal. Following
equation (12) the maximal profit is equivalent to H(X). To derive an efficiency
measure between zero and one, I normalize Gmax. To get zero as the result
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for an inefficient system and one as the result for the most efficient system I
subtract the normalized Gmax from one. It follows:
Eff(X |Yi) = 1−
Gmax(X |Yi)
H(X)
= 1−
H(X)−H(X |Yi)
H(X)
=
H(X |Yi)
H(X)
(13)
Again, I get the informational definition of efficiency. The difference be-
tween no-profit-efficiency and informational efficiency is only given by the in-
formational set. The information set Y ∗ in section 4.1 describes all information
about the system. Information Yi in this section refers only to the information
of one participant and, therefore, the efficiency of the system with respect to
only one participant. If however, the knowledge of one participant i is Yi = Y
∗
(that means that one participant knows everything about the system), this par-
ticipant could be seen as some ’all-knowing’ (ideal) participant. In this case,
no-profit-efficiency and informational efficiency are equivalent. Therefore, the
definition of efficiency could also be formulated as the ability of an ideal trader
to gain profits in a market as is described in the paper of Rothenstein and
Pawelzik [36]. As argued in section 2.3, the no-profit-efficiency is less strong
than the informational efficiency. The reason is, that usually no participant has
access to all information and is therefore not able to make a profit, even if it is
theoretically possible.
5 Sources of inefficiency
In the previous section, I showed that a simplified version of the informational
efficiency measure covers all aspects connected to classical definitions of effi-
ciency. For further analysis, it is useful to enhance this definition to cover more
complex and realistic situations. With the enhanced definition, it is possible to
derive and discuss two main sources of inefficiency in markets.
So far, I have only considered systems in which a given reward is in fair
relation to the probabilities of the event. In such a case, the payed reward is
1
p
. This situation is a special case of a more general case where the reward is 1
q
with q as anticipated probability.13 The efficiency definition changes due to the
maximal profit one can generate in such a system. As Kelly showed [25], the
maximal profit in this case is given by14
Gmax,q(X |Y ) = H(q)−H(X |Y ) (16)
with
H(q) = −
∑
x
p(x) log2 q(x) (17)
13In this paper, I only consider the case without costs in the system. This means, that∑
q(x) = 1.
14In the original paper, Kelly derives his formula not in dependence from the probability
q but from the quote α = 1
q
(fair quote without costs). In this case, the formula is:
Gmax,α(X|Y ) = H(α) −H(X|Y ) (14)
where
H(α) =
∑
x
p(x) log2 αx (15)
with α as the reward payed if the participant predicts the event correct.
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where p(x) is the probability of the event x and q(x) is the anticipated prob-
ability to determine the reward. H(q) is the entropy of the system, including
consideration for the probabilities of payoff payments. H(q) represents the max-
imal profit that could be achieved if one has optimal information about such a
system. From equation (17) one could see that H(q) is minimal when the quotes
are fair (q(x) = p(x)). It follows, that Gmax,q ≥ Gmax∀q and Gmax,q = Gmax if
q(x) = p(x). That means, a player with the optimal strategy can achieve more
rewards in a system with unfair quotes than in one with fair quotes (see section
6.4 and figure 4 for an example).
Taken this into account, the simple efficiency definition:
Eff(X |Y ) =
H(X |Y )
H(X)
= 1−
Gmax
H(X)
(18)
changes to the efficiency definition including unfair quotes:
Effq(X |Y ) = 1−
Gmax,q
H(q)
= 1−
H(q)−H(X |Y )
H(q)
=
H(X |Y )
H(q)
(19)
Just like in the definition with p = q, the efficiency definition is bounded
between zero and one. But in the enhanced case, the denominator is H(q).15
With this extension of the definition, it is now possible to find sources of
inefficiency. Therefore, I start with the enhanced definition of efficiency:
Effq(X |Y ) =
H(X |Y )
H(q)
(20)
Equation (20) shows that the efficiency is influenced by two different terms.
The numerator, H(X |Y ), describes the possibility to predict the future of the
system X by knowing some information Y . H(X |Y ) is maximal (and therefore
equal to H(X)) when there is no prediction-power in the information Y . In
this case, the efficiency is maximal. But, if there is predictability it follows that
H(X |Y ) < H(X) and the efficiency is reduced. The higher the predictability,
the lower is H(X |Y ), and the lower is the efficiency. In the case of a perfect
prediction, both H(X |Y ) and the efficiency would be zero. This represents
inefficiency from predictability.
The second term that influences the efficiency is the denominator H(q).
As mentioned above, H(q) is minimal when the quotes are fair. For all other
quotes, q(x) 6= p(x) is H(q) ≥ H(X). Since H(X |Y ) ≤ H(X), it follows that
Eff = H(X|Y )
H(q) ≤ 1. Therefore, for any case with q(x) 6= p(x) such a system is
necessarily inefficient. This is because in case of unfair quotes, the bookmaker
is going to pay out more than he earns. The difference to inefficiency from
predictability is that a participant can earn money (in such a system) without
any knowledge about the realization of an event (see section 6.4). This represents
inefficiency from wrong pricing.
Of course, the second source of inefficiency could not in all cases be separated
unanimously from the first, since the knowledge of the true distribution often
also reveals knowledge of a single event. But, since the prices/quotes can change
15From equation (16) one can see that Gmax can be maximal H(q) (in the case where
H(X|Y ) = 0). Therefore, the maximal entropy H(q) is used as denominator in this definition,
since H(q) ≥ H(X) ≥ H(X|Y ), this ensures that 0 ≥ Effq(X|Y ) ≤ 1.
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independently from the realization of one event, this source of inefficiency can
be viewed as independent. Overall, the extension to unfair quotes shows that
two nearly independent sources influence the efficiency of a system. One source
of influence is on the level of real events and their predictability, the second is
on the level of the price dynamics/quotes.
6 Example of a tossing coin
In this section, I illustrate the functionality of the informational efficiency def-
inition by using it to determine the efficiency of a game of coin tossing. The
example has the advantage that all figures are computable and, therefore, the
different consequences are visible. In such a case, it is possible to calculate ex-
actly how efficient a system is.16 I show the calculation for different parametriza-
tions: A fair coin with fair odds, a fair coin with unfair odds and an unfair coin
with fair odds.
6.1 Introduction of the game and the parameters
The model works as follows:
A player can bet an amount of one unit on an event x (head ’h’ or tail ’t’ of
a coin). Before the player bets, she gets information y about the result. But,
this information y is correct only with a certain probability p(x|y).17 If she bets
correctly, she gets a reward α = 1/q, otherwise, if she bets incorrectly, she loses
her stake.
The following figures are needed to calculate the efficiency of this model:
1. Probabilities for head and tail:
p(x =′ t′) = 1− p(x =′ h′) (21)
These figures describe the probabilities of a coin to show head or tail after
tossing.
2. Probabilities for right knowledge of the result:
p(y =′ h′|x =′ h′) = 1− p(y =′ t′|x =′ h′) (22)
p(y =′ t′|x =′ t′) = 1− p(y =′ h′|x =′ t′) (23)
with x representing the result of the event and y representing the infor-
mation about the event. p(y =′ h′|x =′ h′) is the probability that a player
gets the information (or has the belief) that the coin shows head if the
result of the coin toss is head. p(y =′ t′|x =′ t′) is, accordingly, the same
for the information (or belief) and probability for tails.
Since there are no restrictions to the given information of head or tail,
the conditional probabilities p(y =′ t′|x =′ t′) and p(y =′ h′|x =′ h′) are
16The definition can be used for any information processing system where an informational
entropy can be calculated (e.g. minority game [7] or the seesaw game [34]).
17Alternatively, information could also be based on beliefs of the agent, which are correct
with a certain probability p(x|y). The mechanism of measuring efficiency is, therefore, not
dependent on external information sources.
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completely independent. However, to reduce the number of free param-
eters, I introduce the restriction to the conditional probability that the
information of the player about the results is symmetric.
p(y =′ h′|x =′ h′) = p(y =′ t′|x =′ t′) (24)
This assumes that the player cannot predict the result of tail better than
the result of head.
3. Probabilities to calculate the quotes:
q(x =′ t′) (25)
is the expected probability for the event tail ’t’. From this probability, the
quotes are derived via α(x =′ t′) = 1
q(x=′t′) .
As mentioned in section 5, in case of no costs the expected probabilities
have to sum up to one. Similar to the case of the real event it follows:
q(x =′ t′) = 1− q(x =′ h′) (26)
For the quote follows:
α(x =′ h′) =
α(x =′ t′)
α(x =′ t′)− 1
(27)
Given the above parameters, three different properties of this system can be
distinguished:
1. Fairness of the result
2. Predictability
3. Fairness of the quote
Each property has a direct relation to the probabilities and vice versa:
1. The coin is fair if p(x =′ t′) = p(x =′ h′) = 0.5. In all other cases the coin
is rated as unfair.
2. The system will be unpredictable if p(x|y) = p(x). In the case of a fair
coin, this leads to p(y) = 0.5. In all other cases, there is some sort of
predictability in the system.
3. Quotes will be called fair if q(x) = p(x) and therefore α = 1/p(x). In case
of a fair coin, it follows that q(x) = 0.5 and therefore α = 2. Otherwise
quotes are unfair.
6.2 Fair, predictable coin with fair quotes
First, I consider the case where the coin and the quotes are fair. In this case,
the efficiency of the coin is determined only by its predictability p(x|y). With
the properties from section 6.1, the efficiency of the coin can be calculated in
dependence from p(y|x). Starting with the definition of efficiency:
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Eff(X |Y ) =
H(X |Y )
H(X)
=
−
∑
p(y) (
∑
p(x|y) log2 p(x|y))
−
∑
p(x) log2 p(x)
(28)
It follows:
Eff(X |Y ) = (p(y|x) − 1) log2[1− p(y|x)]− p(y|x) log2[p(y|x)] (29)
In figure 1, the curve of efficiency E(X |Y ) for a fair predictable coin with fair
quotes is shown in dependence from the predictability p(y|x). The figure shows
that the higher the accuracy of the prediction is, the lower is the efficiency. The
efficiency ranges from zero (for 100% and 0% accuracy of the prediction) to one
(if a correct prediction is on chance level). It also shows that the efficiency is
still around 50% even when the outcome can be predicted with nearly 90%.
Furthermore, one can see that a difference of 10% from unpredictability (that
means p(x|y) = 0.5 ± 0.05) influences the efficiency by less than 3%. However,
an inefficiency of 3% leads in case of coin tossing to 3% mean revenue per toss,
without the risk of going bankrupt.18
6.3 Unfair, unpredictability coin with fair quotes
Second, I consider the case of an unfair, unpredictable coin where the quotes
are fair in relation to the probabilities. If we use the respective relations from
section 6.1, in the efficiency definition shown in formula (28) it follows that the
system is always efficient
Eff(X |Y ) = 1 (30)
Therefore, in case of unpredictability and fair quotes the efficiency is inde-
pendent from the fairness of the coin. For instance, if 9 out of 10 times the
outcome of the coin is head, but the reward is only 10/9 for this event, it is
comprehensibly, that in this case no profit can be generated from the unfairness
of the coin. If there is no further knowledge about the occurrence of this event
(thus p(x|y) = p(x)), the efficiency is 100%. This result illustrates that the
efficiency of the coin system does not depend on the fairness of the coin, but on
the predictability and the quotes.
Interesting in this case, is also the informational contentH(X) of the system,
since it is not static as the efficiency is. H(X) depends on the fairness of the
coin in the following way:
H(X) = (p(x) − 1) log2[1− p(x)]− p(x) log2 p(x) (31)
The curve for the dependence of H(X) on the probabilities p(x) is shown in
figure 2. It is easy to understand that a coin that always shows tail p(x =′ t′) = 1
has no informational content, and therefore H(X) = 0. From this point the
entropy rises to its maximum, the point where p(x =′ t′) = 0.5.
18This follows from equation 16 with H(X) = 1
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6.4 Fair, unpredictability coin with unfair quotes
Another interesting case is when the coin is fair and unpredictable but the quotes
are not fair. In this case the efficiency (shown in figure 3) is:
Eq(X |Y ) = −
1
0.5 log2 q(x) + 0.5 log2[1− q(x)]
(32)
And for the entropy (shown in figure 4) follows
H(q) = 0.5 log2[1− q(x)] − 0.5 log2 q(x) (33)
In figure 3 it is shown that, although there is no predictability for a specific
coin toss, the efficiency is not always one. As discussed in section 5, the efficiency
of the coin falls if the pricing is not correct even without any predictability of a
single event.
Figure 3 shows that the efficiency is around 60% even when the mispricing
is about 90% in comparison to the quote for a fair coin, and that even for a
mispricing of 99% the efficiency is around a relative high value of 30% efficiency.
7 Discussion
In this paper, I introduced a definition of efficiency that enhances existing con-
cepts in precision and universality. The new informational efficiency definition
enables a substantial step in solving the puzzle, whether markets are efficient or
not, by providing a measurement of how efficient markets are. I showed that the
new definition based on informational entropy covers the essence of the defini-
tion of informational-efficiency (see section 4.1) as well as of no-profit-efficiency
(see section 4.2).
By expanding the definition to a wider range of applications (allowing an
unfair pricing (see section 5), I showed that inefficiency can have two sources:
predictability and unfair pricing. Finally, I demonstrated with a simple system
of coin tossing, that, by using the informational efficiency definition, efficiency
can be exactly quantified and I showed the efficiency for different cases of a coin.
One may argue that the new definition only shifts the problem from the
uncertainty of the market model to the uncertainty of the information. But this
is not the case, as the results of the paper show. The new definition delivers far
more advantages:
First, the new definition is able to derive different grades of efficiency, which
was not the case in the previously used definitions. The new definition further
provided a new approach to actually measure efficiency quantitatively. With
this approach, the question of whether markets are efficient or not can shift
from a fundamental debate to a question of measurement, setting the concept of
relative efficiency [27] in place. Therefore, my definition will help to overcome
the binary focus in the discussion of efficiency and help to establish a more
gradual view.
Second, I show in section 5 that it is now possible to carry out theoretical
analyses based on a clear quantitative definition deriving new insights, like the
result that inefficiency can arise from two different sources.
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Third, it is now possible to exactly quantify the efficiency for a wide range
of toy models.19
This introduction is only a first step solving the question of efficiency in
markets and further steps have to follow. The time-dependency of the definition
can be studied as well as the incorporation of some sort of price dynamic in q(x).
Also, I did not consider the case with costs included. But, all these extensions
do not change the fundamental concept behind the new efficiency measure.
This fundamental concept of a measure for efficiency shifts the focus of the
EMH from a fundamental debate to a question of pure measurement. This
transfers the efficient market hypothesis from the actual state of an economic
theory into a quantitative science.
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Figure 1: The graph shows the efficiency of a fair coin in dependence from
the conditional probability p(y|x). It shows that the efficiency is one when the
outcome is not predictable (p(y|x) = 0.5).
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Figure 2: The figure shows the entropy of the coin system in dependence from
the probability of the event showing ’tail’. It shows that the entropy is maximal
when the coin is fair and falls to zero if the probability of the coin to show ’tail’
is one. The graph for ’head’ is identical.
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Figure 3: This graph shows the efficiency of a fair coin that is unpredictable
(but has unfair quotes) in dependence from the estimated probability q(x) of
an event x determining the quote. It shows that the efficiency is one when the
quote is based on the right probability of the event (q(x) = p(x) = 0.5) and falls
to zero if the probability q goes to one and zero, respectively.
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Figure 4: The graph shows the entropy of a fair coin when the quotes are
variable. It shows the dependence from the estimated probability q(x) of an
event x determining the quote. The entropy is rising if the quotes are rising. The
minimum of the entropy is for a fair probability of the quote (q(x) = p(x) = 0.5).
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